Ethical Free Riding: When Honest People Find Dishonest Partners

Corruption is often the product of coordinated rule violations. Here, we investigated how such corrupt collaboration emerges and spreads when people can choose their partners versus when they cannot. Participants were assigned a partner and could increase their payoff by coordinated lying. After several interactions, they were either free to choose whether to stay with or switch their partner or forced to stay with or switch their partner. Results reveal that both dishonest and honest people exploit the freedom to choose a partner. Dishonest people seek a partner who will also lie—a “partner in crime.” Honest people, by contrast, engage in ethical free riding: They refrain from lying but also from leaving dishonest partners, taking advantage of their partners’ lies. We conclude that to curb collaborative corruption, relying on people’s honesty is insufficient. Encouraging honest individuals not to engage in ethical free riding is essential.Social decision makin

The impact of relative position and returns on sacrifice and reciprocity: an experimental study using individual decisions

We present a comprehensive experimental design that makes it possible to characterize other-regarding preferences and their relationship to the decision maker’s relative position. Participants are faced with a large number of decisions involving variations in the trade-offs between own and other’s payoffs, as well as in other potentially important factors like the decision maker’s relative position. We find that: (1) choices are responsive to the cost of helping and hurting others; (2) The weight a decision maker places on others’ monetary payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is in an advantageous or disadvantageous relative position; and (3) We find no evidence of reciprocity of the type linked to menu-dependence. The results of a mixture-model estimation show considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations and confirm the absence of reciprocal motives. Pure selfish behavior is the most frequently observed behavior. Among the subjects exhibiting social preferences, social-welfare maximization is the most frequent, followed by inequality-aversion and by competitiveness

Accidental Outcomes Guide Punishment in a “Trembling Hand” Game

How do people respond to others' accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the actor's intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a “trembling hand”: that is, intentions and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice. One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1's choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1's allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1's payoff. We find that Player 2's responses are influenced substantially by the accidental outcome of Player 1's roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2's responses are influenced by Player 1's intention. However, Player 2 tends to modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution

Height and timing of growth spurt during puberty in young people living with vertically acquired HIV in Europe and Thailand.

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to describe growth during puberty in young people with vertically acquired HIV. DESIGN: Pooled data from 12 paediatric HIV cohorts in Europe and Thailand. METHODS: One thousand and ninety-four children initiating a nonnucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor or boosted protease inhibitor based regimen aged 1-10 years were included. Super Imposition by Translation And Rotation (SITAR) models described growth from age 8 years using three parameters (average height, timing and shape of the growth spurt), dependent on age and height-for-age z-score (HAZ) (WHO references) at antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation. Multivariate regression explored characteristics associated with these three parameters. RESULTS: At ART initiation, median age and HAZ was 6.4 [interquartile range (IQR): 2.8, 9.0] years and -1.2 (IQR: -2.3 to -0.2), respectively. Median follow-up was 9.1 (IQR: 6.9, 11.4) years. In girls, older age and lower HAZ at ART initiation were independently associated with a growth spurt which occurred 0.41 (95% confidence interval 0.20-0.62) years later in children starting ART age 6 to 10 years compared with 1 to 2 years and 1.50 (1.21-1.78) years later in those starting with HAZ less than -3 compared with HAZ at least -1. Later growth spurts in girls resulted in continued height growth into later adolescence. In boys starting ART with HAZ less than -1, growth spurts were later in children starting ART in the oldest age group, but for HAZ at least -1, there was no association with age. Girls and boys who initiated ART with HAZ at least -1 maintained a similar height to the WHO reference mean. CONCLUSION: Stunting at ART initiation was associated with later growth spurts in girls. Children with HAZ at least -1 at ART initiation grew in height at the level expected in HIV negative children of a comparable age